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Problem Posing from the Foundations of Mathematics 
 
Libby Knott1 
Washington State University 
 
Abstract: This reflective paper develops a repertoire of questions for teachers to use in their 
classrooms during episodes of mathematics discussions with and among students. These 
questions are motivated by an examination of questions posed by Wittgenstein in Zettel, and are 
connected to underlying tacit assumptions about mathematics, most of which lie subtly below the 
generally accepted milieu of math-talk. Once classrooms norms have been established to 
encourage participation by all students in a democratic and just classroom environment, these 
questions can be used effectively to stimulate meaningful discourse. These questions provide 
important examples of problem posing designed to encourage student reflection. 
 
Keywords: classroom environment; discourse; history of mathematics; problem posing; 
mathematical discourse; tacit knowledge; Wittgenstein; Zettel 
 
Introduction 
Recent developments in mathematics education research have shown that creating active 
classrooms, posing and solving cognitively challenging problems, promoting reflection, meta-
cognition and facilitating broad ranging discussions, enhances students’ understanding of 
mathematics at all levels. The associated discourse is enabled not only by the teacher’s expertise 
in the content area, but also by what the teacher says, what kind of questions the teacher asks, 
and what kind of responses and participation the teacher expects and negotiates with the 
students. Teacher expectations are reflected in the social and socio-mathematical norms 
established in the classroom.  But not all teachers are adept at asking the appropriate questions in 
a way that enhances learning. Often, they have not had experience in classroom settings or as 
team teachers where this kind of active dialogic discourse has been observable, nor have they 
had opportunities to practice it themselves. How can one short-cut the process of equipping 
teachers with the perspectives and skills they need to respond in routine situations when probing 
and challenging questions are called for? If teachers were to have a repertoire (which some 
teachers eventually gain through trial and error) of questions and insights, they would perhaps 
improve the level of cognitive demand and intellectual stimulation in their classrooms for all 
students, even for those whose classroom participation is infrequent, hesitant or uncomfortable. 
 
To elucidate this kind of repertoire I have gone back into the historical record of mathematical 
discussions and found, in Zettel (Wittgenstein, 1967), a rich source of short phrases or aphorisms 
which I have matched with probing questions that relate to the foundations of mathematics. This 
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resource offers suggestions that correlate with discussions in mathematics classes that I have 
taught, observed, participated in and analyzed during the last two decades.  
 
Background 
Wittgenstein was a major force behind the scenes of some of the most important developments in 
the philosophy of mathematics (as he was also for the disciplines of Psychology, Philosophy, 
Logic, Linguistics and Ethics.) (Marion, 1998) During the twentieth century there were so many 
innovations in science and philosophy that the explanation of the foundations of mathematics by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein most often goes completely unacknowledged. Wittgenstein matriculated 
into Cambridge just as Russell & Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica was printed, and his was 
one of the first critical minds to study it and see its fundamental weaknesses (Russell & 
Whitehead, 1956). He was credited with having convinced Bertrand Russell that his joint work 
was seriously flawed (Ramsey, 1925). Wittgenstein never published a counter explanation, but, 
his explanation of the foundations of mathematics can be found scattered in pieces and bits in 
several of his writings some 50 years after he began that study, after he had been a teacher and 
lecturer for many years, and published only after his death in 1951 (Marion, 1998). One goal of 
Wittgenstein’s effort was to challenge the mindset people have about mathematics, and open a 
door to new ways of thinking. In this essay I have extracted and put together into topical 
categories his expressions about mathematics that were published in his collection entitled Zettel 
(Wittgenstein, 1967). I have taken Zettel as a resource, and from each paragraph identified 
probing questions and hypothetical challenges that will give teachers a repertoire of questions 
and knowledge about mathematical reasoning and reflection, and suggestions on how best to 
stimulate mathematical explanations and justification.  
 
This paper is intended to help teachers prepare to make meaningful discourse happen in their 
own classrooms. Where I have paraphrased or expanded, I have endeavored to preserve the sense 
and uniqueness of Wittgenstein’s insightful comments. This paper is not an overview identifying 
which of Wittgenstein’s concepts and explanations were most influential on mathematicians and 
in the development of mathematics both at Cambridge and more broadly around the world. Nor 
is it an attempt to identify what is missing in Zettel that might be needed to complete the 
discussion of the foundations of mathematics. Much of that discussion can be found in other 
books compiled from Wittgenstein’s writings and published posthumously (Wittgenstein, 1978). 
I have resisted the temptation to say too much about what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover with 
his probing questions and aphorisms. The purpose of this paper is to gather in one place a 
collection of insightful questions and probes that could be used to help teachers pose problems 
for and with their students. 
 
As testimony to Wittgenstein’s relevance in teaching mathematics, his writing and teachings 
have inspired many authors and contemporary experts. Anna Sfard (2008) pays homage to both 
Lev S. Vygotsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein: 
 
…[T]wo giants whose shoulders proved wide enough to accommodate legions of 
followers and a wide variety of interpreters … [They] continue to inspire new ideas even 
as I am writing these lines. This, it seems, is due to one important feature their writings 
have in common: rather than provide information, they address the reader as a partner in 
thinking; rather than presenting a completed edifice with all the scaffolding removed, 
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they extend an invitation for a guided tour of the construction site; rather than present 
firm convictions, they share the ‘doubt that comes after belief.’ These two writers had a 
major impact on my thinking; I can only hope they had a similar effect on my ability to 
share it. (pp. xxi-xxii) 
Whereas the writings of Vygotsky are widely studied by pre-service teachers and educators, 
Wittgenstein is widely quoted but seldom studied. I hope that this paper contributes to correcting 
that deficit. 
 
Wittgenstein usually uses general or surrogate subjects (i.e. colors, words) rather than discipline 
specific topics as examples, and it is up to the reader to see and say “Aha… that also explains 
what is at the basis of mathematics.” Some of the following quotes are to be viewed in this way; 
others are more obviously applicable to the discussion of the foundations of mathematics. I have 
laid these side by side (quotes from Wittgenstein are in italics) to invite development of a 
provocative discussion about the foundations of mathematics, as well as to prompt provocative 
questions for teachers to use productively when planning and implementing instruction. After a 
brief introduction and historical background, what follows is organized into eight categories - 
Emerging Potentialities; Practice Applying Rules; Origins in Nature; Mathematical Procedures; 
Cultural Implications; Teaching relationships; Familiarity with Proofs; and Philosophy of 
Mathematics - to provide a source of questions that are perhaps most germane to the reader’s 
present teaching needs.  
 
Emerging Potentialities 
Important mathematical understanding does not begin in the teen years when students are for the 
first time exposed to Euclidean Geometry and proofs beginning with definitions and axioms. 
Long before this, playtime experimentation with objects and quantities prepares each child’s 
mind to receive more formal instruction in the abstractions that we know as numbers, counting, 
arithmetic and all parts of mathematics. But children are seldom encouraged to reflect on the 
progression from play to formal mathematical reasoning. 
700. Why do we count? Has it proved practical? Do we have the concepts we have, e.g. 
our psychological concepts, because it has proved advantageous? –And yet we do have 
certain concepts on that account, we have introduced them on that account. 
701. At any rate the difference between what are called propositions of mathematics and 
empirical propositions comes to light if one reflects whether it makes sense to say: ‘I 
wish twice two were five!’ 
 
With these questions, Wittgenstein prompts us to think about what is special about mathematics. 
When scientists wish, they develop hypotheses; when writers wish, they develop fiction; when 
doctors wish, they look for alternative cures. In mathematics, wishing is akin to conjecturing, a 
playfulness in asking “What if?”, and “Why?”, and “Why not?”, and “Why does it have to be 
this way?” Taking these questions as a beginning point, I will show how Wittgenstein builds an 
explanation of the language-game of mathematics and how it is not only a different (but in 
important ways parallel) activity to the way we think and live. This language-game2 is a form of 
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Giving specialized meaning to old terms allows mathematicians to say things that might otherwise be difficult to 
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being and doing that is interlaced with our language and our daily activities. As such, it is also an 
intellectual feature of our lives that is identifiable as a separate, dynamic activity. 
 
A historical perspective can be useful, and here Wittgenstein suggests reflection on one’s own 
personal history as it relates to things mathematical.Questions teachers might ask students: How 
did you learn to count? When did you begin to do arithmetic? Can you rephrase this (any 
particular) discussion into a mathematical proposition? Why is this a mathematical proposition? 
Can you wish it to be different, or is it somehow determinate? Can you wish a certain kind of 
result? Can you influence the result with your will? Do you take what you get? 
 
By the time a child develops the notion of conservation of numbers the ability to think and talk 
mathematically is normally well underway (Piaget, 1952.)  Researchers have identified 
rudimentary mathematical thinking in babies as early as two months old (Dehaene, 1997) which 
suggests that the basic sense about “number” is inherited and perhaps instinctive in humans. 
Elementary problem solving, a child’s propensity to experiment and make quantitative choices, 
can be witnessed very early by all observant parents. 
103.  …--But what should be called ‘making trials’ and ‘comparisons’ can in turn be 
explained only by giving examples, and these examples will be taken from our life or from 
a life that is like ours. 
104. If he has made some combination in play or by accident and he now uses it as a 
method of doing this and that, we shall say he thinks. –In considering he would mentally 
review ways and means. But to do this he must already have some in stock. Thinking 
gives him the possibility of perfecting his methods. Or rather: He ‘thinks’ when, in a 
definite kind of way, he perfects a method he has. [Marginal note: What does the search 
look like?] 
105. It could also be said that a man thinks when he learns in a particular way. 
 
Our shared childhood cultural development prepares us to develop (or inhibits) our capacity to 
deal with, think about, and operate with numbers and mathematical symbols. Our intuition (or 
considering, as Wittenstein describes it), guides us. Educators can learn to encourage its 
development in students and teachers. 
 
Questions: How can you make a conjecture and use your knowledge to verify your claim? How 
might you pose “what if?” questions? How can you vary the parameters or values to see a 
generalizable result? What personal experience have you had that shows you that this result is 
valid? Can you predict the result of your work by estimating, rounding off and achieving a quick 
guess? How does your answer compare to the estimate? What do you think will happen if …? 
And of course counting and speaking with numbers has a long tradition even in many prehistoric 
cultures. For example, the Ishango bone, a piece of bone notched with what are believed to be 
mathematically significant tally marks, was discovered in the small African fishing village of 
Ishango, on the border of Zaire and Uganda. It is one of the oldest known mathematical artifacts, 
dating to 20,000 BC. (Zaslavsky, 1979). 
143. We might say: in all cases what one means by ‘thought’ is what is alive in the 
sentence. That without which it is dead, a mere sequence of sounds [i.e., mathematical 
symbols] or written shapes… 
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144. How words [or symbols] are understood is not told by words alone [explanation of 
meaning]. 
 
This suggests not just a vital, but essential role for pictures, graphs, images, symbols, 
manipulatives and other visual displays in mathematics that help to explain and illuminate 
mathematical ideas. 
 
There were well developed cultures in California such as Yahi (Kroeber, 1976) from which we 
have first-hand accounts of how numbers and mathematical thinking were passed on as a sacred, 
mystical tradition comparable to the way some contemporary people use Numerology. For most 
of us mathematics is the language of science and is interwoven into our mundane and routine 
lives. But superstitions surrounding and containing numbers persist in many cultures, including 
our own. 
 
Questions: Why is 3 a lucky number? Why is thirteen considered an unlucky number in many 
cultures? Why is 4 an unlucky number in Japan? Can you give other examples of how number 
words are used in superstitious ways, or, of how numbers are used in popular culture, and 
imbued with special meaning? What is special about prime numbers? Or perfect numbers? 
 
Mathematics teachers may find it interesting and rewarding to watch students in the beginning 
stages as they progress through ever more complex applications. They go through false starts of 
understanding, and then go back and review until it is completely integrated into their mental 
framework. Even the average student can go back to the beginning of the book half way through 
the course and do the “easier” mathematics with greater facility than during the first days. 
Although many students seem to struggle, they learn something, about both the content and the 
tacit rules of operation and construction. 
153. It somehow worries us that the thought in a sentence is not wholly present at any 
one moment. We regard it as an object which we are making and have never got all 
there, for no sooner does one part appear than another vanishes.  
 
This is the kind of mental thinking that can take place as students learn mathematics, or as 
someone develops mathematics even in the most fundamental settings. It helps to explain why 
not all students do their homework correctly each day. Understanding is elusive and sometimes 
tenuous. 
 
Questions: How can you repeat this and say it in a different way? How do we incorporate 
knowledge of irrational numbers, imaginary numbers and exponents, for example, as part of our 
operational system? What rule should we use to factor a polynomial? 
 
I invite you to try Wittgenstein’s exercise which relates to the development of mathematics: 
310. Imagine you had to describe how humans learn to count (in the decimal system, for 
example). You describe what the teacher says and does and how the pupil reacts to it. 
What the teacher says and does will include e.g., words and gestures which are supposed 
to encourage the pupil to continue a sequence; and also expressions such as ‘now he can 
count’. Now should the description which I give of the process of teaching and learning 
include, in addition to the teacher’s words, my own judgment: the pupil can count now, 
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or: now the pupil has understood the numeral system? If I do not include such a judgment 
in the description –is it incomplete: And if I do include it, am I going beyond pure 
description: --Can I refrain from that judgment, giving as my ground: ‘That is all that 
happens’?  
 
Thus, do we think that the evidence for learning is just the accomplishment of the task, not the 
process developed, or the explanation that is given? Can he/she still do it next week? How does 
that relate to participation in the classroom, when a few bright students consistently raise their 
hands first, or dominate in group activity? We should encourage the bright students, give them 
praise; but should we give only them the extra challenge of justifying, proving or generalizing? 
Or is it better to give them an additional application? 
Questions: That looks excellent, tell us how you did that? Can you justify your work? How 
might you generalize your results? Is there another way to look at this problem? 
 
 
Practice in Applying Rules  
Yet the words for numbers and operations that match symbols, and our facility with these at ever 
more sophisticated levels, have their origin in the way we are taught. 
145…If the sign is an order, we translate it into action by means of rules [e.g., + for 
addition, or] or tables. It does not get as far as an impression, like that of a picture; nor 
are stories written in this language. 
146. In this case one might say: ‘Only in the system has the sign any life.’ 
 
Mathematics is in many ways a different language, woven into our ordinary language (or form of 
life) that some master and with which others struggle for their entire lives. It is easy to imagine 
telling someone something about the measurement of a shirt or a hat using mathematical terms 
and realizing by looking at the expression on their face, or hearing their questions, that they do 
not have facility with the mathematics being used, that they are outside the system, do not feel at 
ease participating in that language game. 
 
Questions: Why do we use Greek letters as symbols in mathematics? Can you write a sentence 
that restates what this sign signifies, what it is telling you to do? What is an algorithm? Can you 
identify and emphasize the key vocabulary words (in a new mathematical concept)? Who 
developed this symbol, and when did it come into popular mathematical vernacular?  What 
problems were being posed and why was it important to solve them? When do we use this word 
to mean something else? And is this the best word you can choose for this mathematical use? 
 
Wittgenstein gives a story of how people develop and use rules which provides some insight into 
the foundations of mathematics and their transfer to new generations. 
292. …If an order were given us in code with the key for translating it into English, we 
might call the procedure of constructing the English form of the order ‘derivation of what 
we have to do from the code’ or ‘derivation of what executing the order is’.  If on the 
other hand we act according to the order, obey it, here too in certain cases one may 
speak of derivation of the execution. 
293. I give the rules of a game [e.g., matrix algebra]. The other party makes a move, 
perfectly in accord with the rules, whose possibility I had not foreseen, and which spoils 
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the game, that is, as I had wanted it to be. I now have to say: ‘I gave bad rules; I must 
change or perhaps add to my rules.’ 
So in this way have I a picture of the game in advance? [Sometimes yes, sometimes no – 
perhaps we are inventing new mathematics] In a sense: Yes. 
It was surely possible, for example, for me not to have foreseen that a quadratic equation 
need have no real root. 
 
When Wittgenstein uses examples from mathematics that help explain his point it is perhaps 
easier to see how he intended all of his discussions to also apply to the foundations of 
mathematics even when it is ostensibly about language or thinking. The concept of following 
rules is an essential ingredient of Wittgenstein’s notion of the foundations of mathematics. 
 
Questions:  What rule are you following here? And why is this important to follow? Why is it 
important in addition to align numbers with the decimal points in a vertical column? When you 
find a mistake in your procedure or result, what rule have you violated? How would you explain 
how you can expand this compact notation? Why do you simplify improper fractions? 
It seems reasonable to support the idea that teaching and training is how mathematics is 
transferred from generation to generation, but how did the first mathematician develop his or her 
techniques of solving problems such as telling time or measuring distances? Telling time using 
an analog clock is a rather advanced mathematical activity, judging from the many intermediate 
steps of knowledge development that are needed. Examining the roots of learning mathematics is 
useful both for its own sake and as an activity of hypothesizing about how mathematics came to 
be and how it developed step by step. It is now well acknowledged that mathematical knowledge 
is socially constructed (Sfard, 2008; Vygotsky 1962, 1978). 
412. Am I doing child psychology? –I am making a connexion(sic) between the concept of 
teaching and the concept of meaning. 
413. One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist and [each] teaches his 
children accordingly. In such an important matter as the existence or non-existence of the 
external world they don’t want to teach their children anything wrong… 
419. Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought to remember this.) 
 
Their training, their personal beliefs and competency in mathematics together determine how 
teachers approach the task of teaching. What determines how well students develop a meaningful 
understanding of mathematical concepts? If mathematics is truly a distinguishable language-
game, does a thorough understanding change the person’s life in a way that no other knowledge 
does, e.g., history? 
 
Questions: Is the context of mathematics important to you, or do you simply enjoy engaging in 
the game, puzzle, or algorithm? Do you need to see real-world applications of mathematics in 
order for it to make sense and be meaningful and useful to you? Would you learn mathematics 
more easily if it were connected to your daily life and activities? Write a short story to illustrate 
this mathematics. 
 
Clearly there are a lot of linguistic and cultural skills that come into play when we set out to 
teach and learn mathematics. Consider this simple act of mimicking a certain procedure: 
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305. ‘Do the same.’ But in saying this I must point to the rule. So its application must 
already have been learnt. For otherwise what meaning will its expression have for him? 
306. To guess the meaning of a rule, to grasp it intuitively, could surely mean nothing 
but: to guess its application. And that can’t now mean: to guess the kind of application; 
the rule for it. Nor does guessing come in here.   
 
Students who guess about rather than understand the structure of the application of the rules of 
mathematics often commit the error of false generalization; they apply rules to algorithms where 
these do not apply. And they end up believing that mathematics is akin to magic, or at least 
mysteriously complicated. 
 
Questions: Why can you do the same in this case? Why can you apply the same algorithm here? 
Are you able to transfer your knowledge to a new situation? Can you generalize? Can you extend 
your result? Try to look at different ways of adding and multiplying fractions, and see the results 
obtained when these rules are applied differently. How can you decide whether this alternative 
algorithm is valid? 
 
It is obvious that at each step along the way rules and applications have to be developed, 
assessed, revisited, refreshed, refined and verified before they can be fully understood. 
307. …The application of a rule can be guessed only when there is already a choice 
between different applications.  
 
This statement points to the prior experience and cultural learning from which the student 
benefits but which is often taken for granted. If this is missing then the teacher has to supply 
some kind of equivalent explanation or experience. 
308. We might in that case also imagine that, instead of ‘guessing the application of the 
rule,’ he invents it. Well, what would that look like? Ought he perhaps to say ‘Following 
the rule +1 may mean writing 1, 1+1, 1+1+1, and so on’? But what does he mean by 
that? For the ‘and so on’ presupposes that one has already mastered a technique. 
 
Here Wittgenstein is most explicit about discussing the foundations of mathematics, that these 
are based on the idea that “…one has already mastered a technique.” This is in part what it 
means when we say that mathematical knowledge is socially constructed. A good deal of 
mathematical technique is imbedded in our mathematical language. It is developed as tacit 
knowledge as well, but in learning mathematics we take it out, organize it and put it into a new 
language-game of its own called doing mathematics. When we begin geometry we already have 
ideas about a point and a line, but learn new concepts, and also new definitions that explain and 
clarify familiar concepts. 
 
Questions: Where did the concept of zero develop, and why? What would life be like without 
negative numbers? How did you know what to do to find the next and nth term in a sequence? 
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Origins in Nature 
The suggestion that mathematics is merely a collection of rules to be applied, rather than truths 
of nature, however, is disputed by most mathematicians who think mathematics is fundamentally 
about patterns, and is taken from nature. 
293 (cont.) Thus the rule leads me to something of which I say: ‘I did not expect this 
pattern: I imagined a solution always like this…’ 
And thus our facility with mathematics grows as does the field of mathematics itself. 
294. In one case we make a move in an existent game, in the other we establish a rule of 
the game. Moving a piece could be conceived in these two ways: as a paradigm for the 
future moves, or as a move in an actual game. 
Since the debate about whether mathematics is discovered or invented is long-standing, when 
does it make sense to suggest that Plato with his ‘forms’ was correct? The fact that mathematics 
is essentially impervious to this reflective debate simply goes to show how knowledge of 
mathematics leads (one way or the other) to an identifiably separate form of life. 
 
Questions: Take me step by step through the process you used to get that result. Is it possible that 
some mathematics is both discovered in nature and some invented by humans? Do the processes 
you used and your results hold for any such mathematical proposition…? Can you generalize? 
Can you justify this? Can you restate the problem for me in your own words? Can you write a 
proof? 
 
At the very beginning stages of developing the capacity to do mathematics our training takes 
many forms. But one must look at Wittgenstein’s use of the word “training” in its broadest sense, 
and not just as if one set out to train a horse. This training might include activities that 
Wittgenstein describes in this somewhat different context of learning language, Through this 
“training” we discover that mathematics connects to and explains reality; it is not fiction or about 
arbitrary shapes; further it involves repetition, trial and error and learning by physical 
manipulations. 
195. Let us imagine a kind of puzzle picture: there is not one particular object to find; at 
first glance it appears to us as a jumble of meaningless lines, [or an undecipherable 
mathematical formula or a tricky story problem] and only after some effort do we see it 
as, say, a picture of a landscape. –What makes the difference between the look of the 
picture before and after the solution? It is clear that we see it differently the two times. 
But what does it amount to to say that after the solution the picture means something to 
us, whereas it meant nothing before?  
 
Mathematics often organizes and gives order to nature. This principle of pattern recognition is 
the basis for repetition in teaching, as well as being basic to discovery learning in various forms. 
This repetitive process is said to lead to “endorsable” mathematical statements when by 
following well-defined rules anyone is able to come to the same result (Sfard, 2008; Lakatos, 
1976). 
 
Questions: How does this relate to your personal experience? Have you seen or done this before? 
How does this connect with your prior knowledge? Given a sequence of numbers, how do you 
find the next number? What is your strategy? How is learning mathematics analogous to and 
different from learning a language? Can you apply this same rule in a problem that has bigger 
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numbers, more complications, symbols instead of numbers? At what point did you figure it out, 
or gain understanding? Did it just suddenly make sense? 
 
Is the result obtained in ‡195 based on previous rehearsal, or training? Have you acquired the 
system or algorithm in your mental framework, where the signs and numbers have useful and 
specific meanings? 
228. Explain to someone what the position of the clock-hands that you have just noted 
down is supposed to mean: the hands of this clock are now in this position. –The 
awkwardness of the sign in getting its meaning across, like a dumb person who uses all 
sorts of suggestive gestures –this disappears when we know that it all depends on the 
system to which the sign belongs. We wanted to say: only the thought can say it, not the 
sign. 
 
Wittgenstein often tries to tease his reader into what might be thought of as a traditional mental 
cramp i.e. “…only thought can say it…” This explains how his writings become misunderstood 
when one mistakes his pedagogy for doctrine. He simply wants to say that there is a good deal of 
fundamental cultural background and training that gets absorbed prior to one’s learning to tell 
time, for example.  
 
Questions: From where did you get your concept of time passing? What other kinds of clocks do 
you know about? How can other mechanisms be used to create and communicate [i.e. spherical 
geometry] information? How do signs get their meanings i.e. ÷, ×, ∞? In what other part of life 
do signs have special meanings? Describe the different lengths of hands on the clock and how 
they are used for different kinds of time. When did you first learn this? Who first developed time 
as a concept? Why is time so important? Why are there 24 hours in a day? 
 
Mathematical Procedures 
What does it take to know we have solved a problem correctly, followed a rule, identified a 
characteristic of nature, or developed a useful model? This is certainly an important detail: 
196. We can also put this question like this: What is the general mark of the solution’s 
having been found? 
When faced with problems and challenges of increasing complexity, whether caused by curiosity 
or necessity, humankind did develop counting, geometry and mathematical techniques for 
solving problems, over periods of thousands of years in several geographically isolated locations 
around the globe. We spoke earlier of endorsable results to mathematical theorems and 
propositions. This discussion of verification and justification progresses from this into a usable 
and repeatable procedure. As mathematics grows, this takes us well beyond the exposition of the 
foundations of mathematics.  
 
Questions: What shall we take as proper or sufficient explanation, justification? At each level of 
mathematics what constitutes a proof? What preparation gives students a better capability to do 
detailed proofs later? Can you take the solution and put it back into the original problem to verify 
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Cultural Implications 
There have been many studies that have shown how success in learning mathematics can be 
culturally biased. We criticize standardized tests for having cultural bias that can interfere with 
students’ understanding of the input, the instructional language, as well as the elements of a 
problem, making it difficult for students to demonstrate their mathematical knowledge. 
201. For someone who has no knowledge of such things a diagram representing the 
inside of a radio receiver will be a jumble of meaningless lines. But if he is acquainted 
with the apparatus and its function, that drawing will be a significant picture for him.  
 
Having a broad frame of reference helps students learn mathematics and mathematics contributes 
to this cultural growth of students. Once a method to solve a problem was developed, it became 
part of an expanding form of life that was often shared in an “interactive sphere.” The history of 
 gives a clue to how ubiquitous and specialized mathematical thinking has been. We have to 
also learn (and we share) verification skills that are practical and applicable in our lives as we 
progress with our mathematical education..  
 
Questions: Does that hold true every time you do this…? For every number? What does it mean 
to use sample data that are representative of the whole population? How can you extrapolate 
your results? What kind of visualization skills can you employ to see this shape differently? Is 
mathematics a “universal” language across national borders? Can you verify your result best 
with a sketch, graph, or diagram? 
 
The skill of verification, and motivation for it, is fundamental to the development of the 
language-game of mathematics. Developing this is also connected to developing socio-
mathematical norms in the classroom, and with practice these will become a matter of course. 
309. We copy the numeral from 1 to 100, say, and this is the way we infer, think. 
I might put it this way: If I copy the numerals from 1 to 100 –how do I know that I shall 
get a series of numerals that is right when I count them? And here what is a check on 
what? Or how am I to describe the important empirical fact here? Am I to say experience 
teaches that I always count the same way? Or that none of the numerals gets lost in 
copying? Or that the numerals remain on the paper as they are, even when I don’t watch 
them? Or all these facts? Or am I to say that we simply don’t get into difficulties? Or that 
almost always everything seems all right to us? 
This is how we think. This is how we act. This is how we talk about it.  
 
This is how the foundations of mathematical verification skills get sorted out, often by being 
told: “Do this, don’t do that.” Or by self discovery. When students learn to contribute their own 
reasoning and justifications they take ownership of the mathematics they are learning, and this 
new language becomes part of who they are.  
 
Questions: How can you do that a different way? Can you explain your work step by step? How 
can you look at this operation and find the mistake or error? What role does neatness have in 
preventing errors and in developing a clear form of communication? 
 
There is the expectation, unspoken in most cases, that we use mathematics to connect to, 
understand and explain the world around us, not only as an abstract or academic activity. We 
  Knott 
mathematize our world in so many ways. (Sfard, 2008) How fast is the wind blowing? How 
much food (how many calories) should we (or do we) eat in one sitting? We celebrate birthdays 
and count the days to the next major holiday. We score competitive events, compile performance 
statistics, and race the clock to meet deadlines. Our whole economy is built on the use of 
coinage, and measured in billions and trillions. It is no secret and no coincidence that 
mathematics has become the most widely spoken and only “universal” language of humanity. 
Someone who is ignorant of mathematics gets left out at some level. 
695. The understanding of a mathematical question. How do we know if we understand a 
mathematical question? 
A question –it may be said—is a commission. And understanding a commission means: 
knowing what one has got to do. Naturally, a commission can be quite vague – e.g., if I 
say ‘Bring him something that’ll do him good’. But that may mean: think about him, about 
his state etc. in a friendly way and then bring him something corresponding to your 
sentiment towards him. 
696. A mathematical question is a challenge. And we might say: it makes sense, if it spurs 
us on to some mathematical activity. [E.g., making change, buying groceries.] 
697. We might then also say that a question in mathematics makes sense if it stimulates the 
mathematical imagination. 
698. Translating from one language into another is a mathematical task, and the 
translation of a lyrical poem, for example, into a foreign language is quite analogous to a 
mathematical problem. For one may well frame the problem ‘How is this joke (e.g.) to be 
translated (i.e. replaced) by a joke in the other language?’ and this problem can be 
solved; but there was no systematic method of solving it. 
 
When we translate our activities, patterns or problems from the real world into mathematical 
operations, how well have we done this? (Mathematical modeling and applications.) 
 
Questions: Does it work and make some sense compared to what we are looking at…? Does this 
make sense, have we noticed, interpreted and translated reality accurately? Can you unpack this 
definition into plain language? Can you give an example? What is the proof all about? What does 
it say to us? What if you change this… ? 
 
Teachers have a tendency to think in learned patterns, avoiding the assumptions inside, below or 
prior to these theories or customary operations. Is it helpful to know that much of mathematics 
and learning about mathematics is connected to our culture and to the thinking processes we 
have developed? Is this a benefit or a hindrance? 
375. These are the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgment and 
action goes according to them too. 
382. In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural 
course, and slow cure is all important. (That is why mathematicians are such bad 
philosophers.) 
Wittgenstien’s humor and biases aside, teachers and learners do have to expect to develop new 
skills apart from the way they learned mathematics. If we just keep doing it the same way, 
pedagogy will not improve. 
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Teaching Relationships 
When operating mathematically, do we use the same mental equipment that is used for other 
linguistic (or cultural) activities? Is the thinking and remembering of music any different? How 
much does it depend on a certain propensity for logical thinking or common sense? Why are 
some people said to be “mathematically inclined?” i.e. Gardner’s measure of 
Logical/Mathematical (multiple) intelligence? (Gardner, 2003) 
666. I can display my good memory to someone else and also to myself. I can subject 
myself to an examination. (Vocabulary, dates) [And in mathematics.] 
667. But how do I give myself an exhibition of remembering? [is knowing different?] 
Well, I ask myself ‘How did I spend this morning?’ and give myself an answer. –But what 
have I really exhibited to myself? Remembering? That is, what it’s like to remember 
something? – Should I have exhibited remembering to someone else by doing that? 
668. Forgetting the meaning of a word [or of a symbol] and then remembering it again. 
What sorts of processes go on here? What does one remember, what occurs to one, when 
one recalls what the French word ‘peut-etre’ means? 
669. If I am asked ‘Do you know the ABC?’ and I answer “Yes’ [Can you count to 20?] I 
am not saying that I am now going through the ABC in my mind, or that I am in a special 
mental state that is somehow equivalent to the recitation of the ABC. 
672. …This calculation takes one and a half minutes; but how long does being able to do 
it take? And if you can do it for an hour, do you keep on starting afresh? 
 
Here Wittgenstein is again trying to tease the reader into a mental cramp, or theory to answer 
these hypothetical quandaries e.g. “…how long does being able to do it take?” Scientists now 
know that different parts of the brain are involved in different tasks, but all of those parts are 
components, interconnected and at the disposal of our total thinking apparatus. Similar elements 
and considerations are involved in doing mathematics that are identifiable in our ordinary 
language i.e. grammar, syntax, iconography, vocabulary… and the mental activities that are 
engaged flow together and we usually just take these for granted. Experienced teachers and many 
text books provide learning strategies, and It is a useful teaching practice to solicit strategies 
from students and make learning strategies explicit. 
 
Questions: Why is it important to learn your multiplication facts until you own them? What is 
math fluency? Why is it helpful to be able to convert certain key fractions to percentages from 
memory? Does speed and accuracy in doing the algorithms of arithmetic predict future math 
competency? What is the best way to learn this procedure so that you will remember it?  How do 
you remember what to do with this (or write this) proof? Why is it important for you to have a 
clear understanding of definitions, axioms, and be able to apply them in proving theorems? 
    
By now it should be clear that a facility with arithmetic and with all other mathematics requires 
training and motivation to learn. 
355. …If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, --
that he then proceeds like this and not like that in a particular new case, or that in this 
case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the ‘natural’ continuation for him: 
this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature. 
 
  Knott 
How do we develop and expand our logical-mathematical skills? It is important in teaching to 
understand proximal levels of knowledge. This is also important in the discussion of developing 
proofs. Proving in a subtle way involves a meta-language and techniques that are outside the 
operation of the mathematics in question, and yet connected as a “new case.”  
 
Questions: Can you give me an example of … from your experience? How did you solve this 
challenging problem? Explain how you thought about it. Can you draw a picture of this? How do 
we develop visualization skills? Can you check this conjecture with several examples to 
determine whether it is likely true or not? 
 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of how mathematics is usually a matter of accepted and learned 
conventions, takes on a subtle touch when he uses an example involving taste. 
366. Confusion of tastes: I say ‘This is sweet’, someone else ‘This is sour’ and so on. So 
someone comes along and says: ‘you have none of you any idea what you are talking 
about. You no longer know at all what you once called a taste.’ What would be the sign of 
our still knowing? (Connects with a question about confusion in calculating.) 
367. But might we not play a language-game even in this ‘confusion’? – But is it still the 
earlier one?— 
Teachers know that there is often more than one way to solve a problem.  
373. Concepts other than [those] akin to ours might seem very queer to us [e.g., 
performing arithmetic in base 8]; deviations from the usual in an unusual direction. 
 
Questions: How many different ways can you write a statement of division? Can you look at this 
alternative way of solving this problem and decide whether it is valid? You can visualize when 
we graph in two and three dimensions, but what happens in your mind when you have to use four 
and more dimensions in a problem? Can you count and perform arithmetic in base 8, or use 
numbers to write in code? Is mathematics a science? What did you think about as you solved that 
problem? 
 
Teachers might suggest to students to read over their homework assignment when they receive it, 
make sure they understand it all, and just let it ferment in the brain for a few days. In this way, 
the problem runs its course and a solution often appears unbidden. What does it mean to know 
mathematics? Why is scientific notation useful? 
387. I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation 
for quite different concepts. 
388. For here life would run on differently. –What interests us would not interest them. 
Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in 
which essentially different concepts are imaginable. 
 
Textbooks change and often different textbooks use different notation or different statements of 
the same theorems, definitions, and concepts. Is it possible to imagine a different form of 
mathematics in the same way one could imagine using different number bases? 
 
Questions: Does deciphering codes involve using special techniques? How does guessing 
contribute to solving mathematical problems? How does the development of the computer give 
rise to a whole different kind of mathematics previously unimaginable? Why did you solve it this 
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way? Can there be different geometries? IS the mathematics of infinity the same as regular 
mathematics? 
 
In learning the fundamentals of mathematics, one comes to know early on that symbols are 
specific, and learns how to use each of them in so many different circumstances, and the list 
grows with each new problem solved. 
333. ‘Red is something specific’ –that would have to mean the same as: ‘That is 
something specific’ –said while pointing to something red. But for that to be intelligible, 
one would have already to mean our concept of ‘red’, to mean the use of that sample.  
Substitute the equal sign ‘=’ for “red” in this sentence, and we see how understanding the 
operation of a simple symbol has at its root some understanding of abstractions and the use of 
symbols and the ‘…use of that sample.’ 
334. I can indeed obviously express an expectation at one time by the words ‘I’m 
expecting a red circle’ and at another by putting a coloured(sic) picture of a red circle in 
the place of the last few words. But in this expression there are not two things 
corresponding to the two separate words ‘red’ and ‘circle’. So the expression in the 
second language is of a completely different kind. 
When we think of the symbol  it has a meaning not only because of what we have otherwise or 
previously learned about it, so we can use it without reinventing it every time, but also on a 
deeper or more fundamental level associated with our ability and capacity to use symbols at all: 
336. …The important question here is never: how does he know what to abstract from? 
but: how is this possible at all? or: what does it mean? 
 
Questions: What does the number one ‘1’ stand for?  Are numbers abstractions in the same way 
that other symbols are? Or in a different way? Which symbols are representative such as “£” or 
“∑”? Which contain rules or instructions? 
 
In reading Wittgenstein it is easy to get caught up in the actual content of his examples, rather 
than retaining the idea that color, for example, is a surrogate to develop the philosophical 
concept he is driving at. Here he reaffirms this idea. 
347. The fact that we calculate with certain concepts and not with others only shews(sic) 
how various in kind conceptual tools are (how little reason we have here ever to assume 
uniformity). [Marginal Note: On propositions about colours that are like mathematical 
ones e.g. Blue is darker than white. On this Goethe’s Theory of Colour.] 
Here one might reflect on the lack of uniformity between using cardinal versus ordinal numbers, 
or the multiplicity of ways of representing division. And calculations are performed using 
cardinal numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4…, not 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th…, but also the letters, x, y, n… are used and 
are fundamental to mathematics. 
 
Questions: How can color be important in developing mathematical concepts? Why is red used 
to show a deficit or a loss? How effective are Roman numerals for mathematical manipulations? 
 
Once the process of learning and reproducing proofs begins, mathematics is viewed in a 
somehow different way, as from the outside looking in, as suggested, with ordinary academic 
‘input language’ as a meta-language. Concepts such as generalization and justification become 
recognized as important. 
  Knott 
171. But isn’t understanding shewn(sic) e.g. in the expression with which someone reads 
the poem, sings the tune? [or completes the math problem?] Certainly, but what is the 
experience during the reading? About that you would just have to say: you enjoy and 
understand it if you hear it well read, or feel it well read in your speech-organs. 
172. Understanding a musical phrase [or proof] may also be called understanding a 
language. 
This kind of aesthetic is often related to observing the quality and elegance of a well written 
proof. And being able to write the proof and derive it, shows an understanding well beyond 
simple performance or even beyond explanation. How do teachers share their interest and 
passion for mathematics with their students? 
 
Questions: What are the different techniques you use to write proofs? When do you need to 
provide a proof of a mathematical operation or formulation? 
 
Is understanding mathematically akin to “understanding a musical phrase” or just another move 
in a specialized language-game? 
 
Familiarity with Proofs 
But still students often struggle and lose the meaning of some of the terms, or use them in the 
wrong way, or misunderstand their instructions or the prescribed techniques.  
183. The man I call meaning-blind will understand the instruction ‘Tell him he is to go to 
the bank—I mean the river bank,’ but not ‘Say the word bank and mean the bank of a 
river’. What concerns this investigation is not the forms of mental defect that are found 
among men; but the possibility of such forms. We are interested, not in whether there are 
men incapable of a thought of the type: ‘I was then going to …’ –but in how the concept 
of such a defect should be worked out. 
 If you assume that someone cannot do this, how about that? Are you supposing he 
can’t do that either? –Where does this concept take us? For what we have here are of 
course paradigms. 
How do students understand the expressions the teacher of a proofs class uses? What is the 
prospect for discourse in finding meaning through conversation and exchange of ideas among 
students? It seems that all one’s skills with language and mathematics go into developing an 
acceptable proof; it all comes together in the mind with the suggested rules and ‘paradigms’ or it 
doesn’t. And for so many people; why doesn’t it? 
 
Questions: Do you learn mathematics better in your first language? When should you use 
mathematical induction? When contradiction? What is the role of definitions? When you don’t 
follow instructions, does that mean you can’t do the mathematics next time? How do you learn to 
write a mathematical proof? 
 
In a certain way that is not always clear to a teacher, the practice of and reasons for doing proofs 
are quite foreign to some students. And of course over the years the requirements of what it takes 
to make a good proof have changed; certainly Euclid’s explanations have been revised and 
improved a little. The standards of proof have changed; the conclusions are sometimes different 
because the postulates are different. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry throws a whole 
new set of wrinkles into the discussion.  
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393. It is easy to imagine and work out in full detail events which, if they actually came 
about, would throw us out in all our judgments. 
 If I were sometime to see quite new surroundings from my window instead of the long 
familiar ones, if things, humans and animals were to behave as they never did before, then 
I should say something like ‘I have gone mad’; but that would merely be an expression of 
giving up the attempt to know my way about. And the same thing might befall me in 
mathematics. It might e.g. seem as if I kept on making mistakes in calculating, so that no 
answer seemed reliable to me. 
 But the important thing about this for me is that there isn’t any sharp line between such a 
condition and the normal one. 
 
This kind of imagined dissonance can make students dislike mathematics. There are special 
procedures to use when solving problems (or when attempting to write proofs); once these are 
learned there will be more tools available for solving some problems, but that is not always 
sufficient to allow generalizations to be made to other problems. 
 
Questions: Explain the steps you took; what was your thinking? Why do you think your solution 
is correct and makes sense? What will you do differently next time? 
 
If students fail to learn and do proofs, is it because they are not fully conversant or fluent with 
the language-game of mathematics? 
185. It’s just like the way some people do not understand the question ‘What colour has 
the vowel a for you?’ –If someone did not understand this, if he were to declare it was 
nonsense—could we say he did not understand English, or the meaning of the individual 
words ‘colour’, ‘vowel’ etc.? 
On the contrary: Once he has learned to understand these words, then it is possible for 
him to react to such questions ‘with understanding’ or ‘without understanding’. 
 
And to rephrase: Once one has learned to understand a certain proof and the strategy at stake, 
then it is possible to react with understanding and give explanations, show competence by 
recognizing when a statement about the proof (or an incorrect or incomplete proof) has been 
given incorrectly.  We have thus mastered the language-game.  
186. Misunderstanding –non-understanding. Understanding is effected [and affected] by 
 explanation; but also by training.  
 
It can be a valuable teaching technique to give students incorrect or invalid proofs, and have 
them identify what is wrong, or distinguish valid from invalid proofs. Such exercises are useful 
pedagogical tools not only to assess the students’ grasp of the proof and the mathematics in 
question, but also to help students learn the language of proof writing. 
 
Questions: What do you mean when you use these words…? Does this necessarily follow? Is this 
always true? What are the applications of this? 
Is it always possible to show reasoning, or is intuition a valuable asset in doing mathematics? 
The essential motivation for doing and understanding proofs is to accept the quality of ‘knowing’ 
that is fundamental to the language-game of mathematics. 
  Knott 
408. But isn’t there a phenomenon of knowing, as it were quite apart from the sense of 
the phrase ‘I know’? Is it not remarkable that a man can know something, can as it were 
have the fact within him? –But that is a wrong picture.—For, it is said, it’s only 
knowledge if things really are as he says. But that is not enough. It mustn’t be just an 
accident that they are. For he has got to know that he knows: for knowing is a state of his 
own mind; he cannot be in doubt or error about it –apart from some special sort of 
blindness. If then knowledge that things are so is only knowledge if they really are so; 
and if knowledge is in him so that he cannot go wrong about whether it is knowledge; in 
that case, then, he is also infallible about things being so, just as he knows his 
knowledge; and so the fact which he knows must be within him just like the knowledge. 
 And this does indeed point to one kind of use for ‘I know’. “I know that it is so’ 
then means: I know that it is so’, then means: It is so, or else I’m crazy. 
So: when I say, without lying: ‘I know that it is so’, then only through a special sort of 
blindness can I be wrong. 
This is the kind of certainty and conviction that can be looked for in the language-game of 
mathematics with respect to proofs. 
 
Questions: Does this mathematics fit and connect in some important way to reality? Does your 
process follow all the well established rules for arithmetic, factoring, algebra, induction, logic, 
contradiction or deduction etc.? Can the solutions be verified? 
The proper application and execution of proofs, algorithms, and formulas ought to have a certain 
kind of elegance and grace, as well as a certain degree of convincing. 
410. A person can doubt only if he has learnt certain things; as he can miscalculate only 
if he has learnt to calculate. In that case it is indeed involuntary. 
If one were making mistakes on purpose, that is like lying or fraud in other contexts. 
 
Questions: When is it okay to say this, do this, conclude this? When does that statement have 
meaning or relevance? What kind of explanation would it take to convince you that this 
proposition is true? 
 
Philosophy of Mathematics 
The processes and the mental activities, the forms of life, are what are fundamental to 
mathematics, in a way of speaking, because these are what give rise to the relevance, 
development and perpetuation of mathematics. 
702. If one considers that 2+2=4 is a proof of the proposition ‘there are even numbers’, 
one sees how loosely the word ‘proof’ is used here. The proposition ‘there are even 
numbers’ is supposed to proceed from the equation 2+2=4! –And what is the proof of the 
existence of prime numbers? –The method of reduction to prime factors. But in this 
method nothing is said, not even about ‘prime numbers’. 
703. ‘To understand sums in the elementary school the children would have to be 
important philosophers; failing that, they need practice’. 
In this case Wittgenstein seems to be making the argument that it is through practice and learning 
definitions, that we learn about even numbers and prime numbers rather than through some kind 
of proof, and certainly this is the normal sequence of events. We learn to play, invent, and 
conjecture with prime numbers, even numbers, long before we understand their significance. 
This kind of proof would come possibly in a graduate school mathematics classroom, not in the 
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first grade. We are not born with language or mathematics, or if we were we would all speak the 
same language. 
 
Questions: Can you say that in a different way? How do you know you are right? 
 
The following ending comments in Zettel are not just miscellany; rather these serve as interesting 
challenge questions about how one comes to understand the foundations of mathematics. Initially 
mathematics is a practical tool, producing clear and correct answers to quantitative real-world 
questions; however in the processes of proving and generalizing, the context is often removed, 
and the mathematics is used in what might seem to be an unusual way. Both activities, 
applications and proofs, are parts of mathematics. 
704. Russell and Frege take concepts as, as it were, properties of things. But it is very unnatural 
to take the words man, tree, treatise, circle, as properties of a substrate. 
Bertrand Russell admitted the limitations of his own analysis in his final comment: “After some 
twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the conclusion that there was nothing more that I 
could do in the way of making mathematical knowledge indubitable…” (Russell). 
 
Questions: Who was the first person to use this… math this way? What was Descartes’ most 
important contribution? 
 
Being conversant in the history of mathematics is usually emphasized late in the learning process 
for want of time. Certainly this can be enrichment for any unit in mathematics. Positing a 
problem or conjecture, then providing the answer in the form of a summary of an historical 
solution takes mathematics beyond the walls of the traditional calculation-based classroom. 
705. Dirichlet’s conception of a function is only possible where it does not seek to 
express an infinite rule by a list, for there is no such thing as an infinite list. 
706. Numbers are not fundamental to mathematics. 
 
Then what is mathematics? Is it our intellectual nature that equips us with culture, our training, 
our ability to follow rules, and our linguistic capacity? These are examples of quandaries that 
learners at any level can be encouraged to discuss (in age appropriate ways) which will give 
good practice in justification and reasoning, and make their mathematics training relevant to their 
lives. 
 
Questions: Read this explanation and describe why it is true or false. How would you teach or 
explain this to someone else? How does your tacit knowledge help you? 
 
Research into the fundamentals of mathematics and number theory can be introduced at different 
stages of mathematics education, not just at the college level. 
707. The concept of the ‘order’ of the rational numbers, e.g., and of the impossibility of 
so ordering the irrational numbers. Compare this with what is called an ‘ordering’ of 
digits. Likewise the difference between the ‘co-ordination’ of one digit (or nut) with 
another and the ‘co-ordination’ of all whole numbers with the even numbers; etc. 
Everywhere distortion of concepts. 
  Knott 
 708. There is obviously a method of making a straight-edge. This method involves an 
ideal, I mean an approximation-procedure of unlimited possibility, for this very 
procedure is the ideal. [What does it mean to create a paradigm?] 
 Or rather: only if there is an approximation-procedure of unlimited possibility can (not 
must) 
 the geometry of this procedure be Euclidean. 
709. To regard a calculation as an ornament, is also formalism, but of a good sort. 
710. A calculation can be regarded as an ornament. A figure in a plane may fit another 
one or not, may be taken with other ones in various ways. If further the figure is 
coloured, there is a further fit according to colour. (Colour is only another dimension).  
It is also possible to pose questions that match students’ abilities and talents.  
 
Question: What is the role of aesthetics in mathematics? 
Summary: 
This discussion of relevant quotations from Zettel that relate to mathematics and the foundations 
of mathematics is intended to serve as a resource that may stimulate insights into how 
mathematics came to be, and how reasoning, discourse and thinking about proofs can be 
stimulated. This is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the foundations of 
mathematics, but rather a source for questioning to provoke discussions of learning strategies, 
justifications, verifications and insights in pedagogical settings. There is more that can be said, 
but all explanations must come to an end, and hopefully this is a good beginning. 
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